University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 15

Issue 1

Article 7

2003

Captive-Bred Exceptions: An Unconventional Approach to
Conservation Under the Federal Endangered Species Act
Stephen M. Fernandez

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Fernandez, Stephen M. (2003) "Captive-Bred Exceptions: An Unconventional Approach to Conservation
Under the Federal Endangered Species Act," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 15:
Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol15/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

NOTE
CAPTIVE-BRED EXCEPTIONS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL
APPROACH TO CONSERVATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT*
Stephen M Fernandez"
Ifall the beasts were gone, man would die of a great loneliness of
spirit.For whatever happens to the beasts, soon happens to man.
All things are connected
Chief Seattle, 1854.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Extinction"' is a biological phenomenon that is almost as old as life
itself. Any popular notion that species extinction throughout history can be
attributed primarily to the activities of man is wholly inaccurate.2
Life on earth began roughly four billion years ago, 3 and since that time
our planet has seen numerous periods of mass extinction that cannot be
attributed to human activity.4 Within just the last five hundred million
years, scientists have identified five substantial extinction periods, each
of which resulted in a temporary loss of biodiversity.6 Major physical
events were the primary contributing factors to the die-offs.7 Now,
however, scientists recognize a sixth period of mass extinction where loss
of biodiversity has reached an unprecedented rate. 8 Homo sapiens are the
primary cause.9
The precise rate of modem extinctions is impossible to determine."
Likewise, the exact economic, ecological, and ethical consequences of
species loss are not measurable." Nevertheless, in recent years there has
been an increased awareness of species extinction within the United States
and the international community. With this awareness, various forms of
legal authority have emerged to curb the worldwide loss of biodiversity.
The most significant domestic legislation aimed at protecting vulnerable
species is the Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).12 This Act provides
prohibitions on the taking, possessing, and selling of listed species. 3

I. "Extinct" means no longer in existence or use. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 604 (7th ed.
1999).
2. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1-2 (P.
Stephanie Easley et al. eds., 2001).
3. Id.at 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id."'Biological diversity' [or biodiversity] means the variability among living organisms
from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species
and ecosystems." Id.at I n.2.
7. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 2-3. Major physical events
include primarily climate changes and other geological events that were not products of manmade
activity. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 2.
10. See id.at 6.
II. See generally id.
at 3-6.
12. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 (2002).
13. See id.
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While the ESA provides a legal means for helping preserve
biodiversity, it does so at an economic cost to society. This social cost far
exceeds the mere administrative price of carrying out the Act. Whether a
listed species itself has an economic value or whether the species occupies
habitat that is valued for development, species protection often prevents
the otherwise useful and often profitable utilization of natural resources.
In short, species protection comes with a cost in dollars. 4 The financial
consequences associated with protecting vulnerable species create
significant opposition to ESA by those who stand to lose money due to
regulation. For this reason, it is vital to occasionally reevaluate the ESA in
order to determine whether it can be improved, both from the standpoint
of furthering the Act's purpose of species preservation, and from the
standpoint of limiting the cost of that protection.
This Note will address whether the current version of the ESA provides
the maximum level of species protection given the economic sacrifices
associated with protection. It will focus on the conservation potential of
creating "captive-bred exceptions"' 5 to the ESA that would allow listed
species born in captivity to be sold as agricultural products. The use of
captive-bred exceptions, ifregulated responsibly, could improve the quality
of species protection under the ESA while simultaneously creating a legal
market for listed species products, thus demonstrating that smart
conservation and economic growth are not necessarily inconsistent goals.
This Note presumes there is some undetermined level of economic
16
value that would be created by the sale of captive born listed species.
Thus, the focus of this Note will be to evaluate the potential conservation
costs and benefits associated with captive-bred exceptions. More
specifically this Note will address whether captive-bred exceptions can, in
some cases, conserve wild listed populations by helping to meet market
demand for listed species that were previously over-harvested. Or
conversely, whether these captive-bred exceptions will create a gateway for
illegal trade in poached wild animals.

14. STANFORD

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 10.
15. A "captive-bred exception" is an exception to ESA prohibitions that permits the taking,
possessing, and selling of listed species and their parts when those individual animals were born
and raised in captivity.
16. Because a full assessment of the potential economic value of captive-bred exceptions is
well beyond the scope of this Note, the author has made the assumption that captive-bred
exceptions to protected species law would create some form of economic benefit. An assumption
has also been made that there is some undetermined value, economic or otherwise, in preserving
biodiversity.
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II. MAJOR CAUSES OF EXTINCTION WORLDWIDE

While geological events were the primary cause of past biodiversity
die-offs, manmade factors are the main cause for the current increase in the
rate of extinction.' 7 These manmade causes can be divided into four
primary categories: 1) habitat destruction, 2) over-harvesting, 3) introduced
species, and 4) the effects of pollution. 8
Habitat destruction is the single greatest cause of extinction
worldwide.' 9 It has been estimated that the loss of species habitat is
responsible for sixty-seven percent of endangered, vulnerable, and rare
vertebrates.2" Furthermore, habitat destruction plays some part in about
ninety-five percent of the endangered species listed under the ESA.2'
Over-harvesting has not contributed to species extinction as
significantly as habitat disruption; still, it remains a major obstacle in
preserving biodiversity. 22 For species that suffer from over-harvesting, the
source of the problem is that demand for the actual species, or their parts,
exceeds wild supply. Many of the world's most commonly known and
well-recognized endangered animals suffer or have suffered primarily from
over-harvesting. Examples include: African elephants, hunted primarily for
their ivory tusks; sea turtles, which are highly valued for their shells; and
tigers, which are valued for both their skin and their bones.23
Introduced or non-native species also pose a threat to the continued
survival of certain species. 24 The appearance of introduced species into
non-native habitat is the product of both deliberate 2' and inadvertent
releases. 26 As man has increased the ease and frequency of travel, avenues

17.

MARTY BERGOFFEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REAUTHORIZATION: A BIOCENTRIC

18-20 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein ed., Am. Bar Ass'n Div. for Pub. Servs., Monograph
Series No. 6, 1995). In many areas of the world such as New Zealand, Madagascar, and North
America, increased extinctions occurred contemporaneously with the arrival of humans. Id. at 18.
18. Id.
19. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supranote 2, at 9.
20. BERGOFFEN, supra note 17, at 19.
21. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 9.
22. BERGOFFEN, supra note 17, at 19.
23. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 6.
24. Id. at 7.
25. One example of a willfully introduced species is the release of Butterfly Peacock Bass
into freshwaters in South Florida. The purpose for releasing the species, which is native to
freshwater bodies in South America, was I) to decrease the numbers of other exotic fish species in
South Florida waters, and 2) to create a freshwater fishing industry for recreational fisherman. The
irony of releasing an exotic fish in order to control other exotic fish is as amusing as it is disturbing.
See generally CARLOS HIDALGO, SOUTH FLORIDA'S PEACOCK BASS (1997).
26. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 7.
APPROACH

UNIVFRSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15

for plant and animal species mobility have developed. Species use these
travel gateways to establish populations in different geographic areas, and
the results often prove catastrophic to native species.27
The last of the major manmade sources of extinction is the effect of
pollution. Some of the adverse effects of pollution, such as the impact of
DDT on populations of bald eagles, are relatively clear.2" Others, such as
the potential effect of global warming on biodiversity, remain an enigma
bombarded with environmental speculation.29
Of the four major manmade causes of extinction, captive-bred
exceptions directly affect the conservation equation for only those species
that suffer from over-harvesting.3" The conservation potential of captivebred exceptions rests in their ability to meet the market demand for a
species without relying on wild take. Therefore these exceptions should
have little or no direct impact on species jeopardized by habitat
destruction, introduced species or pollution. Still, the question of whether
captive-bred exceptions can reduce the demand on wild populations of
listed species is important. Over-harvesting is currently the second leading
cause of extinction.3'
Opponents to the creation of captive-bred exceptions typically advance
two arguments as justification for their reluctance. First, there is a fear that
the establishment of a legal market for the trade of captive-bred listed
species might create an avenue for illegally poached products to enter the
marketplace, resulting in increased poaching of listed wild populations.
Second, there is a fear that enforcing the ESA will become an arduous task
because it would be difficult to distinguish legal captive-bred animal

27. Id. The zebra mussel, for example, was accidentally introduced into the Great Lakes
region of North America. Since its introduction, the tiny mussel has contributed to the
disappearance of native freshwater mussels throughout the Great Lakes and portions of the
Mississippi River. Id. at 7-8
28. Final Rule to Reclassify the Bald Eagle from Endangered to Threatened in All of the
Lower 48 States, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,999 (1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11). In the
background section of the Federal Register, the spraying of DDT is mentioned as one ofthe primary
contributing factors that depleted wild populations of Bald Eagles. Id. The species was listed as
endangered in March of 1967. 32 Fed. Reg. 4001.
29. See BERGOFFEN, supranote 17, at 9; see also STANFORD ENVIRONMEwNTALLAW SoCIETY,
supra note 2, at 8-9.
30. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 8. Currently, various types
of amphibians are disappearing from all parts of the world; including protected areas such as
Yosemite National Park. Id. at 8-9. No one is sure what is causing amphibian species to go extinct,
but some scientists suspect that a rise in global temperature and the thinning ozone layer are
primarily responsible. Id. at 9.
31. BERGOFFEN, supra note 17, at 19. It is reported that over-harvesting is responsible for
37% of endangered, rare, or vulnerable vertebrates. Id.
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products from illegally poached products. Both arguments against the
creation of captive-bred exceptions raise valid concerns and will be
discussed in great detail throughout the remainder of this Note.
In addition to these two arguments, a third much more illusive concern
often underlies opposition to the creation of ESA captive-bred exceptions:
that it is morally wrong or a violation of animal rights to raise and kill
listed species. However, it must be made clear from the start that the ESA
is not an animal rights act.32 The explicit purpose of the ESA is to prevent
the extinction of vulnerable plants and animals.33 This goal is subsequently
accomplished by preventing species-specific harm to listed animals. While
this outcome can be viewed as animal kindness, such kindness is incidental
to, and not the specific purpose of,the ESA. Because protecting the animal
rights of listed species is outside the legislative intent of the ESA, any
argument against creating captive-bred exceptions on the basis of animal
right violations is wholly without legal authority. To use the ESA as a
vehicle for animal rights is an abuse of the Act and is especially disturbing
when captive-bred exceptions potentially stand to help wild populations of
a listed species avoid extinction.34
III. FEDERAL

PROTECTION UNDER THE ESA

35
A. Purpose of the ESA

The primary federal authority to protect vulnerable species stems from
the ESA. The ESA was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law
by Richard Nixon in 1973.36 Since that time, it has been called the most

32. If the reasoning behind the creation of captive-bred exceptions is correct, there is no
reason why these exceptions could not extend to all types of listed species. Some listed species such
as African elephants and sea turtles are generally loved and appreciated by the public, and the
thought of raising and killing these species may be hard to stomach. However, this argument against
captive-bred exceptions is an animal rights argument and not a species preservation argument.
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2002).
34. While many may find it deplorable to raise and kill certain listed species, such as
elephants or sea turtles, it is inappropriate to use the ESA to protect captive-bred populations of
these species. Instead, animal rights legislation is necessary.
35. Before the passage of the ESA, more than 500 North American species had gone extinct
since the time of British colonization. BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: HISTORY, CONSERVATION, BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (2001).
36. Id. at 1. The ESA is considered the most far-reaching of any wildlife protection statute.
Id. However, it is not the first federal legislation aimed at directly protecting vulnerable species. See
TONY A. SULLINS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: BASIC PRACTICE SERIEs 2 (2001). In 1966, Congress
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far-reaching wildlife protection statute ever adopted in any country."
Despite its vast reach and sweeping prohibitions, the ESA is essentially a
short, simple statute with a clear congressional aim: "The purposes of this
Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and]
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species... "" Amidst an unrelenting strive toward development
and economic growth, fulfilling this purpose is a formidable task that
should be pursued in a manner that provides the greatest amount of species
protection for the economic value sacrificed.
B. Basic Structure of the ESA
1. Authority to Carry out the ESA
The Department ofthe Interior (DOI)and the Department of Commerce
(DOC) have the shared responsibility of carrying out and executing the
ESA.3 9 The DOI, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), is
responsible for terrestrial and freshwater species.40 The DOC, through the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), retains authority over marine
species.4" Since most listed species are terrestrial or aquatic, USFWS has
the primary responsibility of carrying out the ESA.42
2. Process for Initially Listing Species
Section 4 ofthe ESA provides the listing process for determining which
species are entitled to legal protection.43 Section 4 requires that the
USFWS (or the NMFS) determine whether any species is endangered or
threatened." It also requires the development of a final recovery plan
passed the Endangered Species Preservation Act; this was followed by the Endangered Species
Conservation Act in 1969. Id. Both Acts proved insufficient to protect endangered wildlife. Id.
37. CZECH& KRAUSMAN, supra note 35, at ].
38. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (2002). The ESA goes on to say "It is further declared to be the
policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this
Act." 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(c)(1) (2002).

39.

RAY VAUGHAN, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT HANDBOOK

14 (1994).

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2003).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) requires that any listing be based on the "best scientific and
commercial data available." See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2003)
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designed to facilitate species recovery." Under section 4 authority,
USFWS has adopted regulation that states a species may be listed as
endangered or threatened because of any combination of the following five
factors: 1) present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment
of its habitat or range; 2) over-utilization for commercial, recreational,
scientific, or educational purposes; 3) disease or predation; 4) the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 5) other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.46
3. Listing Categories Under the ESA
Under the ESA, a "species" 47 may be listed as either endangered ' or49
threatened.4" "Endangered species" are those species that the "Secretary
determines to be in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of their range." "Threatened species" are those species likely to
become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of their range.5
In addition to the standard endangered and threatened listings, certain
species may occasionally be listed as endangered or threatened by
"Similarity of Appearance" (S/A). 52 If a species is given an S/A listing, that
species does not meet any of the Section 4 listing requirements and
deserves no direct protection under the ESA. However, the Secretary may
occasionally recognize that a non-vulnerable species so closely resembles
a listed species that ESA protection should be afforded to the non(for list of endangered and threatened animal species); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (2003) (for listed
plant species).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2003). A recovery plan does not need to be developed if the
Secretary determines that such a plan will not promote the conservation of the species. Id. Once a
recovery plan is drafted, there is no requirement to implement the plan. See generally id.
46. Id. § 1533(a)(I)(A-E). The last of the five factors acts as a catchall and works to grant
agency authority under almost all circumstances when a species is threatened with extinction. Id.
The specific protections and prohibitions afforded listed species remains the same regardless ofwhy
the species population declined. Id.
47. The term "species" is defined to include any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and
any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2003).
48. See id. § 1533(a).
49. The word "Secretary" means either the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of
Commerce depending on which agency has authority over the listed species. See 16 U.S.C. §
1532(15) (2003).
50. Id. § 1532(6). Any species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to be a pest
cannot be listed as endangered no matter how depleted its population. Id.
51. Id. § 1532(20).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) (2003).
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vulnerable species.53 The conservation rationale for permitting an S/A
listing and providing protection to a non-vulnerable species is that if ESA
enforcement authorities cannot easily differentiate between protected and
non-vulnerable species, enforcement becomes extraordinarily difficult. An
S/A listing essentially helps close the door to the illegal taking of a
protected species conducted under the guise of taking the non-vulnerable,
physically similar species.54 In creating the S/A category, the ESA favors
overprotection rather than the risk of losing listed species through illegal
poaching.
4. Prohibitions Under the ESA
Only species that have been listed by the Secretary receive protection
under the ESA.55 Once listed, section 7 of the ESA protects endangered
and threatened species from harm caused by the actions of federal
agencies. 6 Section 9 of the ESA provides protection for endangered
species by prohibiting certain actions by any "person," a term that includes
corporations and government bodies.57
The section 9 prohibitions that apply to endangered species generally
apply to threatened species as well. Under the ESA, it is illegal to "take"
a listed species within the United States or upon the high seas.5" "Take"5 9
means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or

53. In order for the Secretary to list a non-vulnerable species as "endangered or threatened
by S/A" he must first determine that:
(A) such species so closely resembles in appearance . . . a species which has been
listed ...that enforcement personnel would have substantial difficulty in attempting to
differentiate between the listed and unlisted species; (B) the effect of this substantial
difficulty is an additional threat to a listed species; and (C) such treatment of an unlisted
species will substantially facilitate the enforcement and further the policy of this Act.
Id.
54. See generallyid. § 1533. For example, the American alligator, which is no longer directly
listed, is very similar in appearance to a related species of alligator in South America. Therefore the
American alligator is currently listed as threatened by S/A. This is done to help eliminate any illegal
trade of the South American alligator by marketing and selling the animal as the American alligator.
A detailed examination of the American alligator can be found in Part IV.A of this Note.
55. VAUGHAN, supranote 39, at 14. No matter how close to extinction a species may be, no
protection is afforded until that species is listed. Id.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2003).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2003).
58. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c) (2003) (containing prohibitions on endangered species); see also
id. § 17.31 (containing prohibitions on threatened species).
59. "Harass" in the definition of "take" is broadly defined to include "an intentional or
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such
an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns ... " 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c).
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collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct., 61 It is also illegal to
sell or offer for sale any endangered species in interstate or foreign
commerce. 6' Because of the strict prohibition against taking listed species
and the prohibition against selling endangered species, commercial activity
in captive-bred listed species is virtually halted unless an ESA exception
applies.
C. Exceptionsfor Listed Captive-Bred Wildlife
The occasional need for exceptions to ESA prohibitions was recognized
by Congress prior to the adoption of the ESA.62 Section 10 of the ESA
provides a list of exceptions, including a "hardship exemption, ' ,63 an
"Alaska natives exemption, '64 and an exception that permits various
prohibited activities if their aim is to enhance species propagation or to
conduct scientific research. These exemptions were included in the original
version of the ESA. However, none of these direct ESA exemptions permit
activities related to the raising, taking, and selling of listed species and thus
do not open the door to commercial activity in captive-bred species.65
For several years in the 1970s, there was a regulation that permitted
otherwise prohibited activities with regard to captive-bred, self-sustaining
populations. However, this rule was deleted in 1979. This old regulation
was replaced by two new exceptions to the ESA prohibitions. One current
exception deals specifically with captive-bred endangered species.66 A
similar, more lenient standard is applied to threatened species. 67 Both of
these new exceptions are considerably narrower than the general captivebred exception of the mid-1970s.

60. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).

61. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(F).
62. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
63. Id. § 1539(b). When any person enters into a contract with respect to wildlife before the
date in the Federal Register of notice of consideration of that species as endangered, the hardship
exception may permit a prohibited activity found in section 9(a) ifthe secretary determines that the
ESA would otherwise cause undue hardship to such person under the contract. Id. However, no
exemption shall be granted for a duration of more than one year from the date of publication inthe
Federal Register. Id. The term "undue hardship" includes, but is not limited to, I) substantial
economic loss and 2) curtailment of subsistence. Id.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2003). This exemption permits certain prohibited activities by
various Alaskan Indian groups if such activity is primarily for subsistence purposes. Id.
65. See generally id. § 1539.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(b)(1).
67. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2003).
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1. General Captive-Bred Exception: 1975-1979
Between 1975 and 1979, the Code of Federal Regulations contained a
general exception to the ESA dealing with captive, self-sustaining
populations.6" The rule gave authority for the Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to list captive, self-sustaining endangered species as
"threatened captive populations."69 Before making this change, the Director
was to consider various factors including: 1) the approximate number of
specimens of that species that exist in U.S. captivity, 2) the number of
persons who have successfully propagated the species in captivity, and 3)
the ratio of wild bom versus captive born specimens of the species.7"
Under this rule, once a species was listed as a threatened captive
population, a person could apply for permits to engage in otherwise
prohibited activities regarding that species.7 Through this permit the
raising, taking, and selling of captive-bred listed species could be carried
out legally.72 Thus for a brief period the door was open to captive-bred
industries involved in the sale of living or dead endangered species.
2. Current Captive-Bred Exceptions: Endangered Species
In September 1979, the "general captive, self-sustaining exemption" to
the ESA was repealed.73 The reasoning mentioned for its removal in the
Federal Register is surprisingly limited. What little reasoning that is
provided states that the adopted rules regarding captive-bred populations,
at that time, eliminated the need for the "general captive, self-sustaining
exemption."74 The current regulation states that holders of valid permits
under the old repealed rule may apply for exemption under the new,
current rule found at 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g).

68. 50 C.F.R. § 17.7 (repealed 1979); see 44 Fed. Reg. 54006 (1979).
69. 50 C.F.R. § 17.7(a) (repealed 1979).
70. Id. § 17.7(b) (repealed 1979). In addition to these three factors, the Director was to
consider 1) the age and sex ratios of such captive specimens, 2) the number of generations of the
species that have been successfully propagated in captivity, 3) the likelihood that persons owning
or controlling such captive specimens will cooperate in ensuring the continued existence of and
reproduction among such captive specimens, 4) the number of requests to take or import wild
specimens of the species received over the previous 24 months, and 5) such other factors as the
Director deems appropriate. Id.
71. Id. § 17.7(d) (repealed 1979).
72. See id.
73. 44 Fed. Reg. 54005 (1979).
74. Id Although the Federal Register made the new regulation seem like a substitute for the
deleted captive-bred exception, the new regulation virtually halted any possibility of legally raising
and selling listed species. See id.
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The current rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g), provides an exception that
allows for taking, transporting, and shipping captive-bred endangered
species in interstate or foreign commerce. There are two possible reasons
that a species may fall under this exception. First, the species may carry a
specific exemption under the federal regulations.75 If the endangered
species is not specifically exempted, it may still fit the exception if a series
of narrowly defined requirements are met.76 The two most relevant
requirements are that 1) the activity's purpose enhances species
propagation or survival and 2) the activity does not involve commercial
buying or selling of nonliving wildlife. 7
The practical effect of these exceptions is that there is no leeway for
permitting the raising and selling of nonliving, captive-bred, endangered
species or their parts. 7' However, the language of 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g)
appears to leave open the possibility of captively breeding and selling live
endangered animals so long as the purpose is to enhance species
propagation and survival. Arguably, this could provide a commercial
avenue for the sale of living endangered species in markets such as the pet
trade.
3. Current Captive-Bred Exceptions: Threatened Species
Exceptions for the raising and selling of threatened species are
essentially equivalent to the exceptions for endangered species.79 Section
17.31 (a), which deals with threatened species prohibitions, directly adopts
section 17.21 's prohibitions on endangered species."0 Therefore, all of the
rules regarding the raising and selling of captive-bred endangered species

75. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g)(6) (2003) (providing a list of roughly thirteen species that are
exempted from the prohibitions on taking, transporting, and shipping species). This exception is
subject to major limitations. Id. First, the purpose of the activity must be to enhance species
propagation or chance of survival. Id. Second, there must be no interstate or foreign commerce of
nonliving species or species parts. Id. The effect of these limitations to the § 17.21(g)(6) exception
is to eliminate any possibility of using the exception as a means for permitting active trade in
captive-bred species.
76. 50 C.F.R. § 17.2 1(g).
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. See id. § 17.31.
80. The only direct difference is that 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(5) does not apply. 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.31.
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also apply to those listed as threatened. However, there is one considerable
difference: "special rules"" may be adopted for threatened species."
Special rules may be applied only to species listed as threatened or
"threatened by S/A."' 3 Essentially, special rules provide species-specific
exceptions that permit otherwise prohibited activity under certain
circumstances. 4 When a species has been given a special rule, 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3 1(c) states that none of the 50 C.F.R. 17.21 prohibitions apply.85
Therefore, the special rule itself contains all applicable prohibitions and
exceptions regarding the species.86 Any activity regarding a threatened
species is permissible under the ESA so long as 1) the species has been
given a special rule, 2) the special rule allows for the activity, and 3) the
requirements of the special rule have been followed by the person
conducting the activity. 7
Through the use of special rules there is considerable potential for
creating exceptions that permit the raising, killing, and selling of captivebred threatened species."8 However, as a practical matter, special rules have
not been used for this purpose.89 One notable exception is the American
alligator, which prompted a special rule permitting limited taking and.
selling.9" Despite the special rule, wild alligator populations have
rebounded over the last thirty years. For this reason, the case of the
American alligator is an excellent example of how commercial activity and
species preservation can exist hand-in-hand.

81. 59 C.F.R. §§ 17.3(c), 424.10. Special rules are only applicable to species listed as
threatened by S/A. Id. They provide exceptions that are specific to each species. See id.
§§ 17.40-.48.
82. Id. § 17.31(c).
83. See generally id. §§ 17.11-.12.
84. See id. §§ 17.40-.48.
85. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 1(c) (2003).
86. Id.
87. See generally id. §§ 17.40-48.
88. Id.
89. See id. § 17.42(c).
90. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(a). Legal issues related to the American alligator will be examined in
much further detail later in this Part IV.A. of this Note.

CAPTIVE-BRED EXCEPTIONS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO CONSERVATION

20031

169

IV. CASES STUDIES

A. The American Alligator: A Case Study
1. Introduction
The two primary arguments against creating captive-bred exceptions to
the ESA are that: 1) they would help open the door to illegally poached
products and 2) enforcement personnel would have a difficult time
determining whether endangered species products came from a legal or
illegal source. Both are valid concerns. If captive-bred exceptions would
in fact increase the poaching of wild listed animals, then restricting or
preventing captive-bred exceptions would be necessary to carry out the
purpose of the ESA. However, the case of the American alligator helps
illustrate that both the "poaching argument" and the "enforcement
argument" are highly speculative and do not necessarily reflect the reality
of how market forces affect the poaching industry. The recovery of wild
American alligator populations, despite the existence of a captive-bred
industry and limited wild take, helps illustrate that meeting market demand
through a regulated legal supply can actually decrease poaching by
deflating the exorbitant prices which drive the poaching industry. Thus,
this case study shows that the recovery of wild populations is, at times,
possible despite commercial trade in the listed species.
2. Biology and Range of the American Alligator
The American alligator, alligatormississippiensis,9" is a large predatory
reptile that lives in warm water rivers, swamps, marshes, estuaries, and
lakes.92 American alligators live throughout the southeastern United States
with a range that extends from North Carolina to southeastern Oklahoma. 93
Adults are typically between six and twelve feet in length with occasional
individuals reaching lengths in excess of fifteen feet.94

91. USFWS: The Endangered Species Program, available at http://ifw2es.fws.gov/
Oklahoma/gator.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
92. Id. Alligators eat a diverse diet consisting of, among other things, fish, turtles, and other
aquatic organisms.

93.

ToMMY

C.

HINES, THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE ALLIGATOR IN FLORIDA

(S.E. Assoc. Fish and Wildl. Agencies No. 33, 1979).
94. USFWS: The Endangered Species Program, supra note 91.
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3. Commercial History of the American Alligator from 1800-1950s
Early records indicate that the American alligator has been used
extensively in commercial trade since at least the early 1800s. 9 By 1870
there was a large demand for alligator products which "[lr]esulted in the
slaughter of many thousands of animals each year . . .," Despite the
enormous supply of wild alligators, demand soon exceeded the wild
domestic supply and prompted imports from Mexico and Central
America. 97 Nevertheless, excessive over-harvesting of domestic alligators
continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. By the 1950s,
large alligators were becoming rare and small skin sizes were normal in the
tanning industry.98 Alligator numbers continued to decline well into the
1960s when federal regulation finally helped stop trade in wild alligator
parts.
4. Regulation of the American Alligator: 1967-1987
The alligator industry changed dramatically after the species was listed
as endangered on the "Endangered Species List" (ESL) in 1967. An
amendment to the Lacy Act99 in 1969 also helped spur changes. Both acts
worked to limit the taking of alligators and helped begin the restoration of
wild populations.
Under the ESL, and later the ESA, takings and other harmful activities
were prohibited. The amended Lacy Act permitted conservation agencies
to control the interstate flow of alligators and alligator parts for the first
time.' The Lacy Act made it a federal offense to sell or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce any form of wildlife, or their parts or
products, in violation of state law.'' As a practical matter, federal
protection under the Lacy Act was only as strong as state law.' 2

95. TED JOANEN & LARRY MCNEASE, WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT: CROCODILES AND
ALLIGATORS, THE MANAGEMENT OF ALLIGATORS IN LOUISIANA, USA, 35 (Grahame J.W. Webb et

al. eds., 1987). It is also reported that as early as 1800, alligator skins were being bought in the area
of Miami, Florida. HINES, supra note 93, at 225.
96. See HINES, supra note 93, at 225-26. It has been estimated that no less than 2.5 million
alligators were killed in Florida between 1800 and 1893. JOANEN&MCNEASE, supranote 95, at 36.
97. JOANEN & MCNEASE, supra note 95, at 36.
98. Id.In addition to excessive over-harvesting, wetland and marsh drainage during the 1950s
and 1960s unquestionably contributed to the reduced numbers of alligators. HINES, supranote 93,
at 226.
99. JOANEN & MCNEASE, supra note 95, at 37.
100. See id.
101. Id.

102. See id.
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The conservation effect of the Lacy Act and the endangered listing was
both substantial and immediate. The movement of alligator hides was
reduced in 1970 and virtually halted by 1971.103 For example, in 1970, the
number of illegal hides bought outside of Florida by one particular buyer
was 11,262;1°4 by 1971 that same buyer purchased only 140 hides.'0 5
In January of 1977, the ESA prohibition on taking alligators was eased
when the USFWS down-listed populations from endangered status to
threatened status in all areas of Florida and in the central coastal areas of
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas." 6 In conjunction with this
change, a "special rule"'0 7 was adopted that permitted limited wild taking
and selling of alligators. 10 8
Despite the down-listing and creation of a special rule that allowed for
the commercial taking and selling of alligator parts, by 1979 alligator
populations in some areas of Louisiana were so plentiful that they no
longer warranted protection under the ESA. °9 The listing of these
Louisiana alligators was again reduced from threatened to threatened by
S/A."10
Over the next eight years, ESA protection for alligators was routinely
reduced and new special rules were adopted that permitted more activity
regarding the taking and selling of alligators and their parts."'
Nevertheless, wild populations continued to increase. In 1987, the USFWS
delisted all populations of American alligators based on biological
evidence that the species was no longer threatened or endangered." 2
However, because the American alligator is similar in appearance to other
vulnerable crocodile and caiman species, it retained a listing of threatened

103. See id.
104. HiNES, supra note 93, at 226.
105. Id.
106. 42 Fed. Reg. 2071 (1977). The USFWS determined that wild populations in these areas
were sufficient for a down-listing. See id.
107. 50 C.F.R. § 17.42(a) (2003). The current version of"special rule" 17.42(a) is even more
lenient in permitting commercial activity with American alligator products. Id.
108. 42 Fed. Reg. 2076 (1977).
109. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37130. This is a clear example where a special rule permitting some
commercial activity did not open the door to poaching to the extent that wild populations could not
recover. Id.
110. Id. The only reason alligators in these areas of Louisiana were not completely removed
from the ESA is because they closely resembled, or were identical, to endangered or threatened
alligators in other surrounding areas. See id.
Ill. See Alligator, American: Federal Register Documents, available at https://ecos.fws.gov/
species_profile/SpeciesProfile?&spcode=COOO (last visited Sept. I1, 2003).
112. 52 Fed. Reg. 21059 (July 6, 1987).
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by S/A throughout its range." 3 Because all populations of American
alligator now fall under the category of threatened, a special rule applies
to all populations.' Under the current special rule, there is a captive-bred
exception that allows for the taking, transport, shipment, sale, and purchase
of any alligator or alligator part, if that alligator was born in captivity or
lawfully placed in captivity."'
5. Recovery of Wild Alligator Populations
The recovery of the American alligator appears to be the primary result
of the enhanced regulation begun under the ESA and the Lacy Act." 6 The
effect of these regulations created an immediate, drastic reduction in the
number of alligator hides available for distribution.'"' Given this drastic
change, it is difficult to argue that the limited, legal commercial trade in
alligator parts was a principal contributor to the species recovery.
However, it is also clear that the regulated commercial activity did not
prevent the species from recovering, and may have helped contribute to the
success of wild populations.
6. American Alligator Conclusion
Despite the logical conclusion that commercial outlets during the 1970s
and 1980s were not the primary contributors to the alligator's recovery, it
is clear that recovery occurred, at the very least, in spite of these
commercial outlets."' This reality works to undermine arguments that any
ESA exception permitting trade in listed species will increase the poaching
of, and harm to wild populations.
This poaching argument has long been the primary reason that captivebred exceptions are unpopular among species conservationists. However,
this trend against a captive-bred industry may be shifting. For example, the
Crocodile Specialist Group (CSG) is an active worldwide network of
biologists, government officials, wildlife managers, independent
researchers, farmers, traders, tanners, and private companies involved with

113. 50C.F.R. § 17.11 (2003).
114. 50 C.F.R. § 17.42(a); see supra Part III.C.3.
115. Id. § 17.42(a). This captive-bred exception is subject to several conditions including; 1)
that alligator parts may be sold only in accordance with state law and 2) that all alligator products
be "tagged" as captive-bred. Id.
116. HINES, supra note 93, at 226. This can be seen from the large decrease in traded hides that
occurred immediately after regulation. Id.
117. Id.
118. See generally 52 Fed. Reg. 21059 (July 6, 1987).
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the conservation of crocodilian species. 9 This group supports the captivebred raising and selling of crocodilian species for both economic and
conservation purposes. 2 ° Over the last thirty years, many species of
crocodilians have shown remarkable recovery. 2 ' The CSG attributes much
of this worldwide conservation success to the alligator industries that help
meet market demand with a legal, regulated supply of alligator products.,1
In another example of the swing toward supporting captive-bred
exceptions, an article on the management of alligators in Louisiana stated,
"[t]he number and severity of alligator law violations were analyzed in
order to determine whether or not the harvest programme [sic] had
stimulated illegal activities . . . it is clearly evident that Louisiana's
123

alligator harvest programme [sic] is not stimulating alligator poaching."'
Given this apparent attitude shift, and the undeniable recovery of wild
alligator populations despite commercial trade in the species, the potential
of a market approach to conservation deserves attention. While the legal
sale of alligator parts may not be the primary reason for recovery, such
commercial activities have not prevented recovery.
At times, however, the prevention of a legal, captive-bred supply of a
listed species can have unintended, negative results when market demands
for the product are not met. The case of the shortnose sturgeon is a prime
example of where the prevention of a captive-bred industry may be causing
significant environmental damage both domestically and abroad.

119. The Crocodile Specialist Group Profile, available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/ssc/

sgprofiles/crocodilesg.htm# (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
120. Id.
121. The Crocodile Specialist Group, available at http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/herpetology/
Crocs.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).

In 1971, when the CSG began, all 23 species of crocodilian were endangered or threatened.
By 1996, after 25 years of effort, one-third of the species (8) were sufficiently abundant to
support well-regulated annual harvests, one-third ofthe species (8)were no longer in danger
of extinction but are not harvested, and one-third of the species (7) remain endangered. No
other group of vertebrate animals has undergone such a dramatic improvement in its
conservation status.
Id.
122. See id.; see also ALLAN R. WOODWARD ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSIC
CROCODILIAN SKIN PRICES: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 15 (presented at The Second Regional

Conference of the Crocodile Specialist Group, Darwin, NT, Australia, Mar. 1993).
123. JOANEN & MCNEASE, supra note 95, at 41.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15

B. Shortnose Sturgeon: A Case Study
1. Introduction
The case of the shortnose sturgeon helps illustrate how the current
prohibitions on listed species may help create adverse environmental
impacts, both for the shortnose sturgeon, other nondomestic species of
sturgeon, and on domestic marine ecosystems.
2. Biology and Range of Shortnose Sturgeon
The shortnose sturgeon, Acipenser brevirostrum,124 is an anadromous
25
fish species that inhabits large coastal rivers in eastern North America.'
Its historic range extended north to the Saint John River in New
Brunswick, Canada and reached as far south as the Saint Johns River in
northern Florida.1 26 Shortnose sturgeon feed on a variety of aquatic
1 27
organisms including crustaceans, insect larvae, worms, and mollusks.
3. Endangered Listing of the Shortnose Sturgeon
The shortnose sturgeon, along with the American alligator, was part of
the original list of endangered species created on March 11, 1967.128 At the
time, no reasons were cited to justify why the species had been listed.129 In
and
1973, the U.S. Department of the Interior stated that pollution
13
overfishing were the principal reasons for the species' decline. 1
The current Final Recovery Planfor the Shortnose Sturgeon, 1998,
identifies both "commercial and recreational" fishing as major factors

124.
125.
National
126.

An anadromous species is a fish that migrates from the sea up a river to spawn.
Final Recovery Plan for the Shortnose Sturgeon 1, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Dec. 1998.
Id. at 2-3. The current range of the shortnose sturgeon is more limited, and the species

may already be extinct in Florida waters. Id.
127. Id. at 41. Shortnose sturgeon feeding patterns vary greatly depending on latitude and
season. Id.
128. 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (1967).
129. See id.; see also Final Recovery Plan, supranote 125, at 1.
130. Final Recovery Plan, supra note 125, at 1. It should be noted that very little historic data
about overfishing exists for shortnose sturgeon. Id. at 3. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the shortnose sturgeon was commonly fished commercially along with the
related Atlantic sturgeon (Acipenseroxyrinchus). Id. Because ofthe similar appearance ofthese two
species, misidentifications ofthe species were frequent. Id. Thus, no reliable estimates of shortnose
sturgeon population sizes exist. See id.
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affecting the recovery of shortnose sturgeon populations. 131 It also lists
bridge and dam construction, pollution, dredging, and introduced species
as factors affecting recovery. 32 Furthermore, shortnose sturgeon spawn
infrequently. 33 Though spawning periodicity is not well understood, the
in some areas, females may only spawn
FinalRecovery Planestimates13that
4
intervals.
year
five
to
in three
4. Current Demand for Sturgeon Products
While sturgeon meat is high quality, the real economic value of
sturgeon stems from caviar: the preciously salted eggs of a mature female.
The highest quality and largest egg size caviar (3.6 - 4.0 mm), comes from
Beluga sturgeon.135 Next in the hierarchy is Osetraor "golden caviar" (3.0
36
- 3.2 mm) and least expensive of
Finally, the smallest (2.7
- 3.5 mm).
37
Sevruga
is
caviar
sturgeon
true
the
Regardless of the type, caviar is expensive. 31 In March 2003, Iranian
Beluga sold through "Paramount Caviar" cost $1,320 per pound. 3 9 Iranian
Osetrawas $1,000 per pound, 40 and IranianSevruga could be purchased
for $680.00 per pound. The shortnose sturgeon produces roe that is similar
in size (3.0 to 3.2 mm),' 4 ' quality, and taste to Iranian Osetra. These
extraordinary prices are the result of a caviar supply that falls well short of
market demand. These prices also illustrate the danger ofan unmet demand
for listed species products. Due to their economic value sturgeon are prime
targets for poaching, and currently many sturgeon species worldwide are
being poached to extinction.

131. Id. at 44-45.
132. See id. at 46-55.
133. See id. at 30.
134. Id.
135. See Rochard E. Acipenser et al., Actes du premier colloque international sur I'esturgeon
495 (P. Williot ed., 1991); see also Hansen Caviar Company, availableathttp://www.hansencaviar.
com/caviarinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
136. Hansen Caviar Company, supranote 13 5 (indicating that shortnose sturgeon produce this
high quality Osetra caviar).
137. Id. Fish eggs from various non-sturgeon species are also consumed with regularity.
Popular examples include salmon, whitefish, lumpfish, and flying fish roe. Id. However, these are
not considered caviar under most definitions.
138. See Paramount Caviar, availableat http://www.paramountcaviar.com/site/go.cffm/owner/
DDFDD497-07D7-40CD-AF200EAA52EECCEA/killnav/yes/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2003)
(displaying current prices and types of available caviar).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Acipenser et al., supra note 135, at 494.
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5. Decline of the Caspian Sea Caviar Market
Until the start of the twentieth century, the United States produced
roughly ninety percent of the world's caviar through the harvest of lake
sturgeon.142 By 1910, the lake sturgeon fisheries had been over-harvested,
and the species was nearly extinct.' 43 Around 1925, heavy commercial
fishing for sturgeon began in and around the Caspian Sea in central Asia.144
From the 1920s through the late 1980s, sturgeon stocks within the
Caspian Sea were tightly regulated by the two countries that shared the
Sea's border: the Soviet Union and Iran. 145 Regulation, adequate
enforcement, and extensive stocking programs ensured that populations
remained stable despite heavy fishing pressures. However, after the
collapse of the Soviet regime in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union lost
control over sturgeon regulation.146 It also lost control of much of the land
surrounding the Caspian Sea. Today, five countries border the Caspian
Sea: Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran. 47 With the
exception of Iran, 4 1 the other nations surrounding the Caspian Sea lack the
resources to adequately implement and enforce sturgeon management
programs. 149 Stocking programs have also suffered. Breeding farms that
once created a sustainable fishing industry and ensured sturgeon survival
now lie abandoned throughout the former territories ofthe Soviet Union. 5
Problems caused by lack of regulation, inadequate enforcement, and the
loss of sturgeon breeding farms have been amplified by chronic poverty in
the areas surrounding the Caspian Sea.'' A single sturgeon provides the
142. American Caviar, availableathttp://206.204.3.133/dir-aaa/colcaviar.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2003). This came from the little known Lake Sturgeon that lived in the great lakes. Id.
143. Id.
144. LISA SPEER ET AL., ROE TO RuIN: THE DECLINE OF THE STURGEON IN THE CASPIAN SEA
AND THE ROAD TO RECOVERY 1 (2000). The Caspian Sea is the largest inland body of water on
Earth, fed by more than 100 rivers. Id. The most important river for the production of caviar is the
Volga River in Russia, which supplies roughly 75% of Caspian Sea sturgeon. Id.
145. ANITA HA ILTON, THE BELUGA'S BLUES; TIME (Asia), Jan. 20, 2003.
146. Id.
147. SPEER ET AL., supra note 144, at 1.
148. See id. at 5. The Iranian Fishery Organization (IFO), or Shilat, is the governmental
organization that regulates sturgeon fisheries and the caviar trade in Iran. Id. The IFO generally
does a good job of managing the fishery which unquestionably helps the fisheries of other, poorly
managed areas. See id. However, Iran has very little important spawning grounds for sturgeon and
therefore has only minimal ability to help restore sturgeon populations. Id.
149. Id. at 2. Enforcement of laws protecting sturgeon have been crippled by a lack of funding
and reports of violence against enforcement personnel. Id.
150. Life Around the World: Russia, Black Gold, LIFE, Feb. 2000, at 28.
151. See SPEER ET AL., supra note 144, at 2-3.
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equivalent of one month's salary for many area residents.' 52 The desperate
poverty surrounding the Caspian Sea, coupled with the high value of
sturgeon products, has naturally resulted in increased poaching.' 53 It is
estimated that poachers currently supply three-hundred tons of illegal
caviar to markets on a yearly basis.'54 This amount is ten times greater than
the amount supplied by legal caviar traders. 55 The result has been a crash
in all populations of Caspian Sea sturgeon and a world demand for caviar
that cannot be met by wild populations.' 56
6. Current Effort to Breed Shortnose Sturgeon
The recent collapse of sturgeon populations in the Caspian Sea,
combined with the tremendous economic value of caviar, has created a
surge of interest in sturgeon aquaculture, both domestically and abroad. 57
Sturgeon farming, in various stages of development and production, is
occurring in several countries, including Germany, Hungary, Romania,
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Chile, Argentina, Iran, the Czech
Republic, and Uruguay. 8 In the United States, Stolt Sea Farms and Tsar
'
Nicoulai Caviar are currently producing caviar from the white sturgeon. 59
Despite the economic success of sturgeon aquaculture, none of the
sturgeon species currently raised in captivity are ideal for aquaculture.
Several factors are considered in determining the ideal species for
commercial purposes. Four of the most important are 1) the size of the
sturgeon when mature, 6 2) the quality of the sturgeon roe, 3) the ratio of
roe to body weight, 16' and 4) the time needed to reach sexual maturity.

152. Id. at 3.
153. HAMILTON, supra note 145.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
See SPEERETAL., supra note 144, at 4.
See generally id. at 12-14.
Id.at 13. Italy, France, and the Czech Republic currently produce 10 tons of caviar a year.

Id.
159. Id. The white sturgeon is native to the cool waters of the Pacific Ocean. Its caviar is
similar in quality to Osetra. Id.
160. Ideally, farmers do not want to deal with enormous sturgeon during their aquaculture
operations. Because some species can measure up to six meters in length and weigh over a ton, the
mature size of the sturgeon becomes important. Bigger fish require bigger grow-out tanks, larger
filtration systems, more food and are difficult to work with when removing roe. For these reasons,
smaller varieties of sturgeon are better suited for aquaculture production.
161. Farmers prefer to have a high roe to body weight ratio. Since the primary value of the
sturgeon is in caviar, the more roe a sturgeon produces the higher its value.
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The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
(FDACS) and scientists working at the University of Florida Department
of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences currently recognize shortnose sturgeon
as the ideal candidate for captive cultivation.' 62 The shortnose sturgeon is
relatively small at maturity and would be easy for farmers to handle during
processing operations. 163 It produces Osetra caviar that is both high quality
and visually appealing. 64 Shortnose sturgeon reach sexual maturity 1 in
65
roughly two to five years, much faster than most other sturgeon species.
Finally, shortnose sturgeon have a high eggs-to-body weight ratio. Roughly
fifteen percent of a mature, ripe female's body weight can be roe. Roe
comprises only around ten percent of the total body weight of many other
sturgeon species. 66 From a biological standpoint, the shortnose sturgeon
remains the ideal candidate for a captive-bred industry.
7. Endangered Listing Under the ESA
The shortnose sturgeon is not currently aquacultured because it is listed
as endangered under the ESA. 67 As discussed earlier, there is no ESA
exception that permits the captive raising and selling of listed endangered
species. 68 Amazingly, the technology exists to breed and raise a virtually
unlimited supply of shortnose sturgeon.
8. Potential Negative Environmental Consequences
Although no explanation was given for the original listing of the
shortnose sturgeon, 161 it can be assumed that the listing was made in an
effort to help prevent the extinction of the species and ultimately to help
wild populations recover so that continued listing would no longer be
162. Some ofthe important factors considered in making this determination are the shortnose's
small body size at maturity (25 kg), large egg size (2.8 - 3.2 mm) and its early maturity when
compared to other sturgeon (3-4 years in males and 5-6 years in females). The author currently
studies aquaculture and shortnose sturgeon under the direction of Frank A. Chapman, Associate
Professor, Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, University of Florida (Mar. 2003present).
163. See Acipenser et al., supra note 135, at 493. The shortnose sturgeon has a maximum
length of 1.3 meters (4.265 ft) and a maximum weight of 45 kg (100 lb.). Id. The Beluga by contrast
can reach 8.5 meters (27 ft) and weigh 1300 kg (2865 lb.). Id.
164. Seeid. at496.
165. See Final Recovery Plan, supra note 125, at 30.
166. There is a great deal of variation between individual shortnose sturgeon. See supra text
accompanying note 162.
167. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2003).
168. See supra Part III.
169. See 32 C.F.R. 4001 (1967).
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necessary. 7 ' As ofyet, shortnose sturgeon populations have not recovered,
and the species carries the same endangered listing it first received in
1967.'17
The current endangered listing represents a hands-off approach that
aims to conserve shortnose sturgeon by prohibiting activities that would
harm any individual animal. This method of conservation undoubtedly
continues to help prevent the commercial taking of wild shortnose
sturgeon. The ESA, however, has provided this protection at the cost and
risk of ignoring an unmet market demand for sturgeon products.
Ultimately, this unmet demand may have a serious adverse environmental
impact on shortnose sturgeon, other foreign sturgeon, and domestic marine
ecosystems. Arguably, much of this adverse impact could be reduced or
eliminated if a captive-bred exception to the ESA was adopted for
shortnose sturgeon.
a. Environmental Consequences for Shortnose Sturgeon
One of the primary reasons for the decline in wild populations of
72
shortnose sturgeon during the twentieth century was over-harvesting.
The shortnose sturgeon's endangered listing under the ESA has ended
much of the nation's unsustainable domestic exploitation. Undoubtedly,
prohibitions have worked to curb wild takings of the species and helped to
prevent its extinction. However, current ESA prohibitions do nothing to
address or relieve the true source of over-harvesting: the market demand.
Market demand for sturgeon products, primarily caviar, remains
exceptionally high, 73 and consequently the prices remain high.'
Indications show that these prices will continue to increase because of the
collapse of the Caspian Sea fishery.
Unmet market demand for sturgeon products places wild populations
of shortnose sturgeon in a precarious position. If individual animals remain
extremely valuable, and if prices continue to increase, incidents of
poaching will increase. Poaching could be diminished by the creation of a
regulated, captive-bred industry that helps meet the public demand for

170. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2003).
171. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2003). While wild populations of shortnose sturgeon have avoided
extinction under current ESA protection, they have not recovered.
172. Final Recovery Plan, supra note 125, at 45. The Recovery Plan also mentions pollution,
construction, dredging, and introduced species as other factors hurting wild shortnose sturgeon
populations. Id.
173. See Paramount Caviar, supra note 138.
174. Id.
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caviar: If the supply of legal caviar increases, prices will decrease. At some
undetermined point, caviar prices will drop to a level where poaching
shortnose sturgeon will no longer be profitable, given the risks.'75
There are two primary advantages in using a market based approach, as
opposed to the ESA's hands-off approach, to help prevent shortnose
sturgeon poaching. First, market forces have the potential to conserve
species in areas where law enforcement is inadequate due to financial or
physical limitations. Enforcement officials can not cover every stretch of
water potentially occupied by shortnose sturgeon. Likewise, they cannot
check every boat that may be poaching. However, market forces apply
everywhere. If the price of shortnose sturgeon products is reduced through
a legal, regulated supply, then the incentive to poach is reduced
everywhere. 76
' Second, from a societal standpoint, it is desirable for people
to have the option of purchasing the foods they wish to consume. If there
is no justified reason for preventing the sale of captive-bred shortnose
sturgeon caviar, then people should have the option to buy it.
Some have argued that opening the market to captive-bred shortnose
sturgeon products will open the door to illegal trade in poached wild
animals. While this is certainly a concern, poaching is more likely to
decrease as market demand is met. It is unlikely that commercial poachers
will assume the risk of poaching wild animals when there is a legal,
regulated supply reducing demand and diminishing poaching profits.
Furthermore, there are not many shortnose sturgeon in the wild, and
catching the few wild animals that do exist would be expensive and time
consuming. A high market price is the only logical reason why a poacher
would spend the time and money to poach. These financial incentives
would not exist if there were an industry supplying the market with a
steady, legal source of sturgeon products.
b. Environmental Consequences for Caspian Sea and
Other Sturgeon Species
The market based approach to conservation, as it relates to shortnose
sturgeon in the United States, also applies to sturgeon poaching in the

175. The major risk for poachers is the possibility that they will get caught. When costs
outweigh the benefits of poaching, it is logical to assume that poaching will decrease.
176. Any idea that poaching can be eliminated is wrong. It is impossible for enforcement to
stop every fisherman that may choose to keep and kill a sturgeon. All that can be done is to make
it economically infeasible to pursue poaching for economic gain. This makes it difficult for
someone to run a profitable business through poaching.
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Caspian Sea and other areas around the world. Unfortunately, poaching
problems outside the United States are severe, significantly more severe
than domestic problems, 7 7 and once again market demand and high
sturgeon prices are the driving forces.
With the extraordinary prices of caviar, there is an overwhelming
economic incentive for poor fisherman around the Caspian Sea to poach
and smuggle sturgeon products. 7 ' The problem will only get worse if
prices continue to increase as they have over the last ten years. In 1989, the
price of Beluga caviar at a Petrossian's New York boutique was about
$204 per 125 grams. 79 In 2002, the price for the same 125 grams had
jumped to $419.80 The price increases are creating an even greater
economic incentive for poaching. The problem is compounded by the lax
enforcement of anti-poaching laws by local officials around the Caspian
Sea.' 8 ' Because a high percentage of Caspian Sea caviar is consumed in the
United States, 8 2 a captive-bred shortnose sturgeon industry that helps
supply domestic demand would relieve much of the over-harvesting
pressure put on wild, nondomestic populations of sturgeon.
c. Consequences to Domestic Marine Ecosystems
Beyond the potential adverse impacts to worldwide sturgeon
populations, the ESA may also be helping to harm domestic marine
ecosystems. Under the ESA, it is currently illegal to raise and kill most
domestic species of sturgeon. However, the possession, taking, transport,
and sale of many foreign sturgeon species is permissible. As a
consequence, frustrated aquaculturalists unable to raise domestic sturgeon,
despite the potential profitability, have turned their attention to raising
exotic sturgeon.8 3
From a commercial standpoint, this may prove to be very profitable.
However, from an environmental standpoint, the importation of an exotic
species presents a significant problem. 4 The specific goal of the ESA is

177. See HAMILTON, supra note 145.

178. Richard Nalley, Roe Rage, FORBES, Nov. 1I, 2002.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181.

Id.

182. HAMILTON, supra note 145, at I ("Americans swallow up to 80% of the annual beluga
harvest"). Ninety percent of the harvest of Beluga sturgeon is illegally poached. Id.
183. Currently there is a push in Florida to begin aquaculture industries using Russian
sturgeon. Within the last week, a shipment of several thousand fry was sent to commercial
aquaculture farms throughout Florida. See supra text accompanying note 162.
184. See STANFORD ENvRoNmENTAL LAW SOcIETY, supra note 2, at 7.
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to protect vulnerable species and the natural environment. However, in the
case of the shortnose sturgeon, the ESA has indirectly encouraged the
introduction of thousands of exotic Russian and Siberian sturgeon fry
which will be raised on aquaculture farms. None of these exotic sturgeon
can be sterilized because they are being raised primarily for eggs that do
not form after sterilization. This creates an enormous potential for the
accidental release of fertile, exotic sturgeon into domestic waters. The full
consequence of an accidental release remains a mystery. However, in the
past the introduction of exotic species has caused severe adverse
environmental impacts, including the extinction of other native species. 85
9. Shortnose Sturgeon Conclusion
Current ESA prohibitions on endangered species prevent the possibility
of creating captive-bred industries that would help meet market demands
for over-hunted sturgeon species.' 86 This could cause several adverse
environmental impacts that are not consistent with the purpose ofthe ESA.
The case of shortnose sturgeon illustrates these problems and displays one
example where ESA prohibition may not only be hurting the listed species,
but also causing other significant adverse environmental impacts, both
domestically and abroad.
C. Listing of the Beluga: A Case Study
1. Introduction
Wild sturgeon populations worldwide are suffering. Over-harvesting is
a primary cause, but other factors such as habitat destruction and pollution
are also taking a toll.'87 Of all the sturgeon species, arguably the Beluga is
in the most eminent danger of extinction. Recognizing this danger,
environmental organizations such as the World Conservation Society, the
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, and Sea Web have collaborated to
raise public awareness and help conserve remaining Beluga populations.
These organizations have developed "Caviar Emptor," a campaign to make

185. See supra text accompanying note 27.
186. See 50 C.F.R §§ 17.21, 17.31 (2003).
187. See SPEERET AL., supra note 144, at 2-4.
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buyers aware that consuming caviar has pushed many sturgeon species to
the brink of extinction. 8 They have also petitioned to have the Beluga
listed as endangered under the ESA.'89
2. Biology and Range of the Beluga
The Beluga is a sturgeon of central Asia that once inhabited the
Caspian, Black, Azov, and Adriatic Seas.' Today, populations in the
Adriatic and Azov Seas have been extinguished. 9 ' In the Caspian and
92
Black Seas, population numbers continue to decrease at an alarming rate. 1
Once again, over-harvesting is one, if not the major, cause for the decline.
Left undisturbed the Beluga can grow to an almost mythic size. With
a length that can reach 8.5 meters (27 ft), the Beluga can weigh over 1300
kg (2865 lb.). 193 Unfortunately, along with its great body size, the female
Beluga also carries the biggest, most expensive, and most desired caviar
in the world.' 94 The largest individual Beluga ever recorded contained 990
lbs. of eggs and would have an estimated street value today of 1.6 million
dollars.' 95 Current over-harvesting practices ensure that Beluga no longer
reach this size; still even a single fish can be extremely profitable. Further
increasing the problem: Beluga 197
are relatively easy to harvest, 196 yet they are
mature.
to
slow
long-lived and
3. Petition to List Beluga as Endangered Under the ESA
Like all of the sturgeon species in the Caspian Sea, Beluga populations
have suffered immensely following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since
the Soviet regime dissolved, regulation and enforcement of the Beluga
fishery is virtually nonexistent. Hatcheries that once flooded the Caspian
Sea with Beluga fingerlings now lie abandoned. In recognition of the
Beluga's plight, the Caviar Emptor campaign published Roe to Ruin: The
Decline of the Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea and the Road to Recovery in

188. See National Resources Defense Council, Caviar Emptor, available at http://www.nrdc.
org/wildlife/fish/caviar.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
189. 67 Fed. Reg. 41918 (2002).
190. 67 Fed. Reg. 41919.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Acipenser et al., supra note 135, at 494.
194. See HAMILTON, supra note 145.
195. SPEERETAL., supra note 144, at 5.
196. 67 Fed. Reg. 41919 (2002). The Beluga is also considered easy to catch and harvest. Id.
197. Id. Reproductive maturity in Beluga sturgeon is reached at between 11 and 17 years of
age. Id.
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December of 2000.19 The goal was to increase awareness of how caviar
consumption is decimating sturgeon populations.'99 In 2002, Caviar
Emptor petitioned the USFWS to list the Beluga as endangered under the
ESA.200
4. Contradictory Recovery Recommendations for Beluga
The Caviar Emptor publication Roe to Ruin provides a fairly
comprehensive analysis of why the organization petitioned to list the
Beluga. Over-harvesting, habitat destruction, and pollution are all
mentioned as contributing factors. 2° ' But more interesting are the six policy
Individually, each
recommendations for Beluga recovery. 2
recommendation seems to provide measures that will help the Beluga
recover. However, upon a closer evaluation, the recommendations conflict.
In Roe to Ruin, Caviar Emptor recommends that Beluga be listed as'
endangered under the ESA, °3 the goal being to limit domestic Beluga
caviar importation, thus reducing worldwide demand and ultimately
diminishing the profitability of poaching. However, Caviar Emptor also
recommends "[E]nvironmentally sound aquacultured caviar as an
alternative to Caspian Sea Caviar., 204 It further claims that aquaculture
represents a major opportunity to reduce pressure on wild supplies.20 5
Clearly the goal of listing the Beluga as endangered and the goal of

198. SPEERETAL., supra note 144. This publication does an excellent job tracing the history
of Caspian Sea sturgeon and also provides policy recommendations for recovering populations of
sturgeon. See id.
199. See National Resources Defense Council, supra note 188.
200. See 67 Fed. Reg. 41918 (2002); see also Tim Friend, Legal Action Filedfor Protection
of Beluga Sturgeon; USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2002.
201.

SPEERETAL., supra note 144, at 2-4.

202. Policy recommendations include: 1) stopping the international trade of Beluga caviar, 2)
listing Beluga as endangered under the ESA, 3) providing funding for restoration of the Caspian
Sea fishery, 4) increasing U.S. enforcement of international trade restrictions, 5) promote
at 14-18.
environmentally sound aquaculture, and 6) strengthen state management of sturgeon. Id.
203. Id. at 15.
204. Id. at 16.
205. Id. Caviar Emptor also recognizes that certain aquaculture facilities raise other
environmental concerns such as pollution, possible escape ofaquacultured fish, and the use of wild
fish parts for making fish food. Id. Currently the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is
developing regulatory standards for aquaculture. Id.
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promoting domestic aquaculture production of Beluga are in direct
conflict. Once listed as endangered, there is no potential to reduce demand
through the production of farm-raised fish.2 °6
5. Beluga Sturgeon Conclusion
The conflicting policy recommendations in Roe to Ruin were clearly not
intended. Caviar Emptor was created for the purpose of conserving wild
populations of Caspian Sea sturgeon. However, the legal implications of
an endangered listing cannot be ignored. An endangered listing would put
an immediate halt on the legal importation of Beluga caviar and also
ensure that Beluga demand cannot be reduced through domestic captivebred production.
This scenario begs an obvious question: which form of protection will
help the Beluga more, listing or domestic production? But this question
need not be answered. It should be irrelevant because these two forms of
protection are not naturally conflicting goals. They are instead legally
conflicting goals that can be solved through legal modifications to the
ESA; we could have both forms of protection. Ideally, wild populations of
Beluga could be listed to help limit wild poaching. At the same time, a
captive-bred exception could be adopted that permitted and encouraged
domestic Beluga farming. This constitutes a two-sided, proactive approach
to conservation that promises to provide a greater level of species
protection than either listing or domestic production separately.
V. RISKS AND BENEFITS OF CAPTIVE-BRED EXCEPTIONS

A. PotentialRisks of Captive-BredExceptions
Before the creation of a captive-bred exception to the ESA for any
individual species, several factors must be considered to determine whether
a captive-bred industry could put wild populations at risk. Unless certain
conditions are met, captive-bred exceptions should not be used.
The single most important factor to consider when analyzing the risks
associated with a captive-bred exception is whether the industry is capable
of meeting, or at least significantly reducing, demand for the listed species

206. The technology for breeding Beluga sturgeon in captivity has been available for years and
does not pose a limitation to commercial production. See Life Around the World: Russia, Black
Gold, supra note 150.
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product. The whole concept of captive breeding as a conservation measure
rests on the economic principal that as supply increases, prices, and
therefore poaching, will decrease. A potential conservation nightmare
could occur if a captive-bred exception were granted for a highly desired
listed species and the industry was only able to meet a small portion of the
demand. This would leave prices high while providing an avenue for
illegal traders to slide poached animals into the market place.
To determine whether a captive-bred market has the potential to
significantly meet demand, several factors should be considered. First,
does the technology exist to consistently breed and raise the listed species?
Clearly technological limitations could undermine the success of the
industry and ultimately the success of the wild populations. Second, how
easily can farmers successfully propagate and raise the species in captivity?
If the technology exists, but is very expensive or requires scientific
expertise, farmers may have problems breeding the species. Likewise, if
the species is difficult to raise in captivity, large die-offs may be
anticipated. Either of these two factors could lead to a reduced commercial
supply, thus leaving wild populations at greater risk of poaching.
Beyond market demand, other factors deserve consideration, like how
"brood stock"20 7 will be obtained. To begin a captive-bred industry,
farmers will need initial individuals to commence the breeding process. If
adequate captive brood stock is not available, the industry would require
wild take to begin production, which would create clear problems for listed
wildlife. If captive brood stock is not available, a captive-bred industry
may not be feasible from a conservation standpoint.20 8
Another factor to consider is the difficulty law enforcement personnel
would have in distinguishing legal, captive-raised individuals from
poached wild animals. This potential problem is increased when
enforcement personnel are dealing with animal parts rather than whole
species. For example, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish between
captive-bred shortnose sturgeon caviar and poached shortnose sturgeon
caviar once the eggs have been removed from the animal and packaged. In
the case of the American alligator, the problem was partly solved by a
requirement in the special rule that all captive-bred alligator parts be

207. Brood stock is the initial supply of animals required to begin a captive-bred operation.
208. For many endangered species, such as the shortnose sturgeon, a significant supply of
captive individuals already exists. Captive shortnose sturgeon are held at three USFWS facilities
and at the University of Florida. This supply is sufficient so that no wild takings would be necessary
to create a captive-bred industry for the species. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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tagged.2" 9 Still, if there will be great difficulty in tagging and distinguishing
a captive-bred species from wild poached animals, then a captive-bred
industry may hurt wild populations and thus not be warranted.
Also, captive-bred exceptions are not the answer to recovering all listed
species that have suffered from over-harvesting. If wild populations of a
species have in the past suffered from over-harvesting, but currently suffer
from habitat destruction or pollution, then clearly reducing demand on wild
individuals alone is insufficient to protect the species. However, even in
this scenario the captive-bred exceptions would not hurt wild populations.
Furthermore, certain species, because of their nature, do not lend
themselves to being raised in captivity. For example, the notion of
captively raising blue whales to reduce poaching is preposterous. The size
of the blue whale ensures that it cannot be raised in captivity for
commercial production. Despite the limitations of captive-bred exceptions,
many listed species could be raised in captivity and sold without harming
wild listed populations.
Finally, there is one more risk which is more philosophical than
practical. The ESA has long stood as a pillar of species protection law. It
could be argued that creating a captive-bred exception to the otherwise
strict hands-off ESA prohibitions could weaken the protective nature ofthe
Act, both currently and in the future. This is especially true given the
current federal administration that frequently challenges the validity and
reduces the protection of environmental laws. 211 In the worst-case scenario,
the creation of captive-bred exceptions could set precedent for further
reductions in ESA protection, and these further reductions could
potentially harm listed species.
On the other hand, by permitting captive-bred exceptions when wild
populations will not be effected, the ESA may be strengthened by limiting
unnecessary opposition to the Act. This could lead to greater protection
because advocates of species protection law could focus their efforts on
limiting activities that truly threaten wild populations. The ultimate effect
the creation of captive-bred exceptions would have on the future strength
of the ESA is not clear. This uncertainty is unquestionably one of the risks
associated with changing the nature of the prohibitions under the Act.

209. 50 C.F.R. § 17.42(a)(2)(C) (2003). This rule requires state officials to tag all alligator
hides and file them with the Federal Wildlife Permit Office. Id. Further requirements indicate that
tags 1) must be made of permanent material; 2) must show the state of origin, the year of take, the
species, the serial number; and 3) that the tag cannot be opened and reused once attached to the
hide. Id.
210. See generally National Resources Defense Council, The Bush Record, available at
http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/default.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
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B. PotentialBenefits of Captive-BredExceptions
1. Economic Benefits
Clearly there are some economic benefit from the trade of captive-bred,
" ' While the focus of this Note is whether captive-bred
listed species.21
exceptions can be useful for conservation purposes, it is important to
understand that these exceptions have enormous economic potential.2" 2
Furthermore, meeting the market demand benefits society as a whole
because society is able to obtain a desired product. At times, this economic
potential undermines the credibility of arguments in favor of using captivebred exceptions for conservation purposes. This is unfortunate. There
appears to be ample indication that reducing demand for a listed species
through captive breeding can further the conservation objectives of the
ESA. The fact that there is also an economic benefit cannot be denied, but
the true issue of whether captive-bred exceptions could help certain listed
species should be addressed without prejudice against arguments favoring
captive breeding.
2. Conservation Benefits
The primary conservation benefit created by captive-bred exceptions
stems from the reduced price of listed species products. Basic supply and
demand models indicate that when demand exceeds the supply of a
product, prices rise. When the prices of listed species rise, wild populations
remain at a higher risk of poaching. What is not as initially apparent is that
a reduction of market demand for a certain listed species may have
secondary effects that help other similar, vulnerable species. The prime
example is the shortnose sturgeon. If this domestic species were raised in
sufficient numbers, the U.S. demand for foreign sturgeon products would
decrease. Thus, the incentive for poor Caspian Sea fisherman to poach
nondomestic sturgeon would be reduced. This market approach could be
used to help protect foreign species outside the domestic reach of the ESA.
A second conservation benefit of creating captive-bred exceptions for
native, listed species is that the exceptions would encourage the raising of

211. See Florida Agricultural Statistics Publication, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov//fl

rtocO.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
212. Often, the poor living in rural areas are the primary economic benefactors from captivebred operations. A prime example is the current clam culture operation in Cedar Key, Florida.
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domestic species, thus helping to avoid problems associated with
accidental releases of exotic species. Again, the shortnose sturgeon
example illustrates the point. Faced with an unmet market demand for
caviar, and unable to raise native shortnose sturgeon, farmers in Florida
have turned to raising Russian sturgeon.213 Over time, accidental releases
of these exotic fish are virtually guaranteed; the Florida environment is at
risk, and no one knows the consequences. If shortnose sturgeon had been
used instead of Russian sturgeon, an accidental release would result in
nothing more than the unintended stocking of native endangered species
into Florida waters.
Clearly the ESA was not intended to encourage the import of exotic
species for breeding purposes. This was an unanticipated result.
Nevertheless, the threat of introduced sturgeon is real and immediate.
Unless an exception permitting the sale of captively raised shortnose
sturgeon is adopted, problems associated with escaped Russian sturgeon
are virtually certain in Florida's future. There may also be secondary
benefits to species from a captive-bred industry. When there is a market
value for a species, investors are often willing to provide money for
scientific research on the species. Currently, chickens are one of the most
extensively studied and thoroughly understood animals on earth due to the
enormous financial potential in raising chickens. The better the animal is
understood, the more profitably it can be raised. Likewise,
the better an
214
animal is understood, the better it can be conserved.
VI. POLICY SUGGESTIONS

The creation of captive-bred exceptions for endangered species under
the ESA would not be a policy change affecting every listed species. These
exceptions would be irrelevant to the conservation equation for species that
have been listed due to habitat destruction, pollution, or introduced species.

213. Currently, scientists at the University of Florida have imported thousands of Russian
sturgeon fry and are distributing them to aquaculture facilities throughout the state. Several
thousand Siberian sturgeon are currently on order and should be distributed to farms within the next
couple of months. See supra text accompanying note 162.
214. See, e.g., Final Recovery Plan, supra note 125. In the Final Recovery Plan for the

Shortnose Sturgeon, many of the key recovery factors listed in the recovery outline deal with
obtaining a greater understanding of the basic biological and management needs of the shortnose
sturgeon. See id. Additionally, the research facilities and increased knowledge of the species can
also help programs designed to reintroduce captive-bred populations into the wild. See supra text
accompanying note 162.
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Furthermore, even for species listed due to over-harvesting, the various
factors discussed in Part V.A. of this Note illustrate that captive-bred
exceptions should not be universally applied to all endangered species.
Accordingly, decisions regarding captive-bred exceptions need to be
determined on a species-by-species basis. Blanket regulatory approval of
captive-bred exceptions unquestionablyjeopardizes listed wild populations
and is therefore contrary to the intent of the ESA. However, if species are
evaluated individually and important criteria are met, the approval of
certain limited exceptions would further the ESA's purpose.
Amending federal regulations to permit a limited captive-bred
exception for endangered species would be relatively straightforward. The
mechanism for permitting these exceptions for endangered species could
be similar to the regulation found in 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (c), which applies
only to threatened species once a special rule has been adopted. Once a
special rule has been adopted for a threatened species, none of the normal
prohibitions for that species apply. Instead, the special rule contains all
applicable prohibitions and exceptions.
A regulation similar to 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(c) should be adopted for
endangered species. This new regulation could allow for the creation of
special rules applicable to individual endangered species once certain
criteria have been met. Through these special rules for endangered species,
it would be possible to have legal, species-specific captive-bred exceptions
that allow for commercial trade in nonliving endangered species. Any
special requirements or prohibitions, such as a requirement that an
endangered species product be tagged and traced to its place of final sale,
could also be included in the special rule.
While 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 provides a good example of how a captivebred exception could be created, a similar regulation created for
endangered species should contain more guidance concerning when and
how a special rule should be adopted. The federal regulations give no
specific requirements for adopting a special rule. Because endangered
species are in greaterj eopardy, there should be tighter control and guidance
concerning the approval of a special rule. To achieve this control, a list
should be included in the regulations that explicates what factors need to
be considered before a special rule may be adopted for any endangered
species. Two of the primary factors that must be considered are 1) whether
the biology of the species lends itself to captive breeding, and more
importantly 2) whether a captive-bred industry can meet a significant
portion of the market demand, enough to reduce prices for the listed
species' products. If these or the other factors mentioned are not
considered, a captive-bred exception for that species should not be granted.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The ESA represented an unprecedented and extraordinary conservation
effort when it was adopted in the early 1970s. At the time, the Act's
purpose of species preservation was revolutionary and in many ways
symbolized a change in the national and worldwide attitude toward
protecting the natural environment. Today the ESA remains a pillar of
conservation strength providing protection for hundreds of species of
plants and animals. However, despite its overall positive effect, the ESA
should not be considered the ultimate species protection law. The ESA,
like every law, should on occasion be objectively evaluated when there are
indications that improvement is possible. A periodic evaluation will
encourage changes that may help further the purpose of the law, and also
help confirm that certain aspects of the law should remain untouched.
Current ESA prohibitions severely limit the conservational and
economic potential of captive-bred industries. This outcome may not have
been intended by the legislators who adopted the ESA. The language of the
ESA seems to indicate that protection of wild listed species and their
habitats was the goal of the Act, not the protection of captive-bred species
that can be reproduced in virtually infinite numbers. The creation of ESA
exceptions permitting the taking and selling of captive-bred animals would
not necessarily violate the original legislative intent. Indeed, in many cases
the purposes of the ESA would be furthered, while simultaneously creating
economic growth. Captive-bred industries and species protection laws do
not necessarily have conflicting objectives; both can contribute to listed
species protection. The mere fact that captive-bred industries also stand to
create economic value should not be used to dismiss an objective
evaluation of their conservation potential.
Furthermore, the USFWS and the NMFS may not have the authority to
prohibit captive-bred exceptions if such authority was not delegated under
the ESA. It appears from the plain language of the statute that the
legislature had no intent to protect captive populations: the number of
animals held in captivity is not considered when determining whether to
list or delist a species. The USFWS and the NMFS discount captive-bred
populations when making these types of decisions. This is a true
inconsistency under ESA law, and it may leave agencies open to legal
challenges to the validity of prohibitions against captive-bred industries
especially if it can be shown that the prevention of a captive-bred industry
for a particular species is potentially harming wild populations of that
species.
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At an international level, market forces are a much more affective
conservation mechanism for protecting nondomestic species than a simple
listing on the ESA. Currently there are many nondomestic species listed
under the ESA.215 The only real conservation reason for listing
nondomestic species is to limit the import of that species into the United
States. However, the true conservational effect of limiting U.S. importation
is minimal if international demand still exists. The listing of nondomestic
species on the ESA appears to be more a gesture in the spirit of
conservation than a comprehensive approach to preserving biodiversity." 6
The major obstacle preventing the creation of captive-bred exceptions
to the ESA may not even be related to species conservation. Instead, it is
an animal rights argument disguised as a species protection argument.
Many wild populations of listed species may in fact benefit from captivebred exceptions, thus the prevention of captive-bred exceptions may be
inconsistent with the purpose of the ESA. However, it is often unsettling
to consider opening the door to the use of listed species as agricultural
products. Once the door is opened to commercial activity for one species,
this door is potentially opened for all species. Many may not consider it
morally wrong to raise and kill sturgeon, but they might find it appalling
to do the same thing with regard to African elephants. Certainly this
concern has merit, but it is an animal rights issue, not a species protection
issue. If it is truly immoral or unethical to kill certain types of animals, the
protection for these species should be provided through direct animal rights
legislation. Protection should not be afforded under the guise of species
conservation through the ESA. This is an abuse of the ESA and violates
the purpose for which it was adopted.
As the human population continues to grow worldwide, it is unrealistic
and foolish to assume that the demand for all listed species will diminish
through strict prohibition. Even as worldwide environmental awareness
increases, the sheer number of people on this planet ensures that there will
always be a demand for listed species and their products. Until rather
recently, technological limitations prevented the successful creation of
captive-bred exceptions for many species that may have benefitted.
Fortunately, technological advances now allow us to captively breed and
raise many of the species that have traditionally been over-harvested. By

215. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (2003). Some examples of ESA listings of nondomestic
species include the Chinese alligator, the New Zealand thrush, and the Asian tiger. Id.
216. It would be better to get nondomestic species listed on the Convention for Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). 50 C.F.R. § 23 (2002). The purpose of the CITES agreement is to
regulate international trade in species of animals and plants. Id. Unlike the ESA, CITES actually
has legal authority over counties that have signed the agreement. Id.
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responsibly utilizing technology to help meet the market demand for listed
species without relying on wild takings, technology should become an
important environmental tool that helps further the true purpose of the
ESA: Species Preservation.
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